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1 Introduction
One of the key tenets of Marxian economics is the idea that exploitation and
class are defining features of capitalist economies. This raises two issues.
First, the existence of a logically coherent and empirically meaningful defi-
nition of exploitation and class. Second, the economic mechanisms that lead
to the emergence and persistence of exploitation and class.
The first issue has received a lot of attention in the literature. The re-
ceived view is that no logically consistent and empirically meaningful defi-
nition exists which captures the key positive and normative insights of the
Marxian theory of exploitation and class in general economies. This view
has been questioned in a series of recent papers by Yoshihara and Veneziani
[34, 35, 27]. In these contributions, the concept of exploitation is analysed
using a novel, general axiomatic approach which allows one to rigorously
capture the normative and positive foundations of exploitation theory. Con-
trary to the received wisdom, it is shown that there exists a nonempty class of
logically consistent definitions - conceptually related to the so-called “New In-
terpretation” (Dume´nil [7]; Foley [11]; Mohun [15]; Dume´nil, Foley, and Le´vy
[9]) - that satisfy a set of desirable properties in general convex economies
with heterogeneous agents - including the existence of a robust relation be-
tween profits and exploitation, as well as between class and exploitation.
These contributions, however, focus on one-period economies with no
savings and accumulation, and have relatively little to say about the second
issue in the opening paragraph, namely the dynamics of class, exploitation,
and profits. This is not a minor issue. In his seminal theory, Roemer [19] has
proved that exploitation and classes emerge as the equilibrium outcome of
differential ownership of the means of production in competitive economies
with optimising agents when capital is scarce, leading him to conclude that
the normative relevance of exploitation reduces to an exclusive emphasis on
asset inequalities.
Yet Roemer’s results have been derived in one-period models whereas cap-
italism, according to Marx, is an inherently dynamic system geared towards
capital accumulation and so one may argue that class and exploitation should
be analysed in a dynamic framework. In dynamic accumulation economies,
it is not difficult to show that capital may become abundant, leading profits
and exploitation to disappear (Devine and Dymski [6]). Perhaps more sur-
prisingly, Veneziani [22, 23] and Veneziani and Yoshihara [24] have proved
that if savings are allowed in a dynamic capitalist economy, then asset in-
equalities are necessary for exploitation to emerge, but alone they are not
sufficient for it to persist even if agents do not accumulate in equilibrium.
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These results cast doubts on the claim that asset inequalities are necessary
and sufficient for the emergence and the persistence of exploitative relations,
and raise the issue of the determinants of exploitation and class.
This paper adopts the conceptual approach to exploitation proposed by
Yoshihara and Veneziani [34, 35, 27] in order to study the dynamics of as-
set inequalities, exploitation and classes. We significantly generalise Roe-
mer’s [18, 19] accumulation economies with maximising agents in order to
incorporate nonstationary prices, population growth, time-varying consump-
tion norms, technical change, and distributive conflict. We analyse - both
formally and computationally - the dynamic equilibrium trajectories of the
economies and their class and exploitation structures, and generalise some
fundamental insights originally proved by Roemer [19], including the so-called
Class-Exploitation Correspondence Principle (henceforth, CECP).
To be specific, we consider three main models exploring different mecha-
nisms for the emergence and persistence of exploitation and class. We start
off by analysing a basic economy with constant consumption, population,
and technology: this benchmark scenario confirms the insights of the previ-
ous literature by showing that accumulation leads exploitation to disappear
because the economy eventually becomes labour constrained.
We then extend the model to consider technical innovations, population
growth, and consumption dynamics. Empirically, the long-run evolution of
capitalist economies has indeed been characterised by an increase in (aver-
age) consumption opportunities and by a tendential expansion of technical
knowledge, leading to a progressive increase in labour productivity (Flaschel
et al. [10]). Theoretically, our analysis confirms that labour-saving technical
progress may play a crucial role in making exploitation persistent by guar-
anteeing the persistent abundance of labour (Skillman [20]). In other words,
the capitalists’ control of investment and innovation decisions can make ex-
ploitation persistent by maintaining labour unemployment over time.
Although many actual capitalist economies have indeed gone through
long spells of labour unemployment, one may argue with Roemer [19] that
a general theory of exploitation and classes should not crucially depend -
either positively or normatively - on structural imbalances in factor markets.
Exploitation and class are characteristics of capitalist relations of production
and full employment does not make capitalist economies non-exploitative.
Therefore we analyse an extension of the basic model with population growth,
technical change and accumulation in which full employment occurs in every
period and distribution is determined using a general Nash bargaining pro-
cedure with the bargaining power of each agent endogenously determined as
a function of their ownership of the means of production and class solidarity.
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The results are quite striking: technical change and population growth are
not sufficient to make exploitation persistent unless capitalists are sufficiently
powerful and class solidarity among propertyless workers is sufficiently weak,
even if the economy never becomes labour constrained. Capitalist power is an
essential determinant of the persistence of exploitation and class.
In all economies, we analyse the evolution of the structure of exploita-
tive relations. By deriving a robust correspondence between class and ex-
ploitation status, the CECP yields relevant normative insights on capitalist
economies. Yet, the CECP draws a rather partial, coarse picture of the struc-
ture of exploitative relations: two economies with similar numbers of agents
belonging to each class and each exploitation category may still be very dif-
ferent. Based on Yoshihara and Veneziani [34, 35, 27], we propose a novel
index of the level, or intensity of exploitation for individual agents, whose
distribution provides a finer and more comprehensive picture of exploitative
relations. The analysis of its distribution yields relevant normative insights,
and it raises some interesting issues that are conceptually analogous to those
discussed in the literature on the measurement of income inequality.
Another contribution of the paper is methodological. Given the com-
plexity of the economies considered, the paper adopts a novel computational
approach to Marxian exploitation theory. Pioneering work applying compu-
tational methods to Marxian theory includes Wright [31, 32, 33], Cogliano
[4], and Cogliano and Jiang [5]. But the latter contributions focus on Marx-
ian price and value theory and the circuit of capital rather than exploitation
and class. More related to our work is an unpublished paper by Takamasu
[21], which adopts a computational approach to study class formation in ac-
cumulation economies. Yet this paper does not analyse exploitation and it
only considers a very basic scenario with constant technology, population and
consumption. Moreover, there is no explicit analysis of agents’ maximising
decisions or of the equilibrium conditions.
By moving beyond the straightjacket of analytical solutions, a computa-
tional approach allows us to study the equilibrium determination of exploita-
tion status and the Class-Exploitation Correspondence Principle, and trace
the co-evolution of exploitation and class over time in complex economies
with endogenous technical change, population growth, norm-based consump-
tion dynamics, and generalised N -agent bargaining. The results obtained are
robust to changes in the specification of technology, population, preferences
and endowments, but also of some of the behavioural assumptions.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the gen-
eral framework. Section 3 analyses the benchmark economy with stationary
technology, population and consumption. Section 4 derives some key theo-
4
retical results concerning class and exploitation in the basic model. Section
5 presents the index capturing the level of exploitation of each agent. Sec-
tion 6 analyses the dynamics of the basic model computationally. Section
7 extends the analysis to economies with exogenous technical change and
population dynamics, whereas section 8 focuses on the role of bargaining
and power in economies with full employment, endogenous technical change
and population growth. Section 9 presents the robustness checks. Section 10
concludes.
2 The framework
Consider a dynamic extension of Roemer’s [19] accumulating economy with a
labour market and only one good produced and consumed.1 In every period
t = 1, 2, . . ., let Nt denote the set of agents with cardinality Nt and generic
element ν. At the beginning of each production period t, there is a finite set,
Pt, of Leontief production techniques (At, Lt), where 0 < At < 1 and Lt > 0,
and all agents have access to the techniques in Pt.
In every period t, agents have identical preferences but possess potentially
different endowments of labour, lνt−1, and capital, ω
ν
t−1, inherited from previ-
ous periods. The distribution of endowments at the beginning of t is given
by Πt−1 =
(
lνt−1
)
ν∈Nt ∈ R
Nt
++ and Ωt−1 =
(
ωνt−1
)
ν∈Nt ∈ R
Nt
+ . In every t, each
agent ν ∈ Nt is therefore completely identified by a duplet
(
lνt−1, ω
ν
t−1
) ∈ R2+ .
An agent ν ∈ Nt endowed with
(
lνt−1, ω
ν
t−1
)
can engage in three types of pro-
duction activity: she can sell her labour power zνt ; she can hire others to
operate a technique (At, Lt) ∈ Pt at the level yνt ; or she can work on her own
to operate (At, Lt) ∈ Pt at the level xνt .
Following Roemer [18, 19], we assume that production takes time and
current choices are constrained by past events. To be precise, wages are paid
ex post and wt ∈ R+ denotes the nominal wage rate at the end of t, but every
agent must be able to lay out in advance the operating costs for the activities
she chooses to operate using her wealth W νt−1. Letting pt ∈ R+ denote the
price of the produced commodity at the end of t and beginning of t+ 1, the
market value of agent ν’s endowment - her wealth - is W νt−1 = pt−1ω
ν
t−1. The
wealth that is not used for production activities can be invested to purchase
goods to sell at the end of the period, δνt .
1Given our focus on the dynamics of exploitation and class, the one-good assumption
yields no loss of generality. The model can be extended to include n commodities, albeit
at the cost of a significant increase in technicalities and computational intensity.
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Our main behavioural assumption postulates that agents wish to accu-
mulate as much as possible, subject to consuming bt ∈ R++ per unit of
labour performed, Λνt ≡ Ltxνt + zνt . Within every period t, we consider bt as
a constant parameter, identifying a socially-determined basic consumption
standard, but we do allow for the possibility that bt changes endogenously
over time incorporating evolving social norms, culture, and so on.2
This modelling choice is motivated by our focus on the dynamics of ex-
ploitation and class in capitalist economies characterised by a drive to ac-
cumulate, rather than on consumer choices. Theoretically, it is consistent
with the classical-Marxian tradition where consumption is largely the prod-
uct of social norms, rather than utility-maximising behaviour, and it allows
us to analyse the persistence of class and exploitation abstracting from het-
erogeneous individual consumption behaviour. Unlike in many accumulation
models in the Marxian tradition, however, the introduction of a consump-
tion standard raises some interesting theoretical and technical issues, as it
imposes a relevant and oft-neglected constraint on the set of equilibria.
3 The basic model
In this section, we analyse the basic model, which is characterised by sta-
tionary population, technology, preferences, consumption norms, and labour
endowments. We focus on the basic model for analytical clarity and because
it provides a theoretical benchmark and starting point for our analysis. How-
ever, the framework, concepts, and definitions can be easily extended and the
results derived continue to hold in more general economies (as confirmed also
by the simulations).
Let Nt = N , Pt = P = {(A,L)}, bt = b, and
(
lνt−1
)
ν∈N = (l
ν )ν∈N for
all t, and suppose that the economy can produce a surplus: (1− bL) > A
or, equivalently, 1 − vb > 0, where v = L(1 − A)−1 denotes the embodied
labour value. In every t, given (pt−1, pt, wt), every agent ν ∈ N chooses
ξνt ≡ (xνt ; yνt ; zνt ; δνt ) to maximise her wealth subject to purchasing b per unit
of labour performed (1) and to the constraints set by her capital (2) and
labour (3) endowments. Formally, every ν solves the following programme
MP νt :
max
ξνt ∈R4+
ptω
ν
t
2Observe that bt does not specify an absolute level of subsistence and agent ν can
always reach the consumption standard Λνt bt if she does not work at all. Our treatment
of subsistence is a generalisation of Roemer’s [19] accumulating economies in which the
subsistence level is set equal to zero at all levels of Λνt .
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subject to
ptx
ν
t + [pt − wtL] yνt + wtzνt + ptδνt = ptbΛνt + ptωνt (1)
pt−1Axνt + pt−1Ay
ν
t + pt−1δ
ν
t = pt−1ω
ν
t−1, (2)
Lxνt + z
ν
t 5 lν . (3)
Let Aν (pt−1, pt, wt) be the set of actions ξνt that solve MP νt at prices
(pt−1, pt, wt). Let V νt
(
pt−1ωνt−1; (pt−1, pt, wt)
) ≡ max ptωνt be the value of
MP νt . Let (p, w) ≡ {(pt, wt)}t=1,... and let (xν ; yν ; zν ; δν ) ≡ ξν = {ξνt }t=1,....
A basic accumulation economy is defined by agents N , technology (A,L),
consumption bundle b, labour endowments Π, and initial capital endowments
Ω0; and is denoted as E(N ; (A,L) ; b; Π,Ω0), or, as a shorthand notation, E0.
Let xt ≡
∑
ν∈N x
ν
t , and likewise for yt, zt, δt, ωt, Λt, and l. Based on Roemer
[19], the equilibrium notion can be defined.
Definition 1: A reproducible solution (RS) for E(N ; (A,L) ; b; Π,Ω0) is a
vector (p, w) and associated actions (ξν )ν∈N , such that at all t:
(a) ξνt ∈ Aν (pt−1, pt, wt), for all ν ∈ N (individual optimality);
(b) A(xt + yt) + δt 5 ωt−1 (capital market);
(c) Lyt = zt (labour market);
(d) (xt + yt) + δt = bΛt + ωt (goods market).
At a RS, in every period: (a) all agents optimise; (b) aggregate capital
is sufficient for production plans; (c) the labour market clears; (d) aggregate
supply is sufficient for consumption and accumulation plans. E0 can thus be
interpreted either as a sequence of generations living for one period or as an
infinitely-lived economy analysed in a sequence of temporary equilibria.
It may be argued that the concept of RS imposes stringent requirements
on agents’ rationality and expectation formation. For, agents trade in the
good and labour market at the beginning of each period based on expecta-
tions of prices that will form at the end of the period, and in equilibrium
these expectations are exactly correct. Two points should be made here to
motivate the focus on RS’s. First, formally, because the RS is a temporary
equilibrium notion, it imposes much less stringent rationality and consistency
requirements than standard intertemporal optimisation models. Indeed, as
shown below, provided agents correctly expect a nonnegative profit rate and
a real wage above the mimum standard to emerge at the end of the period,
their choices will be optimal even if their expectations turn out not to be per-
fectly accurate. Second, theoretically, our purpose is to analyse the dynamic
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equilibrium trajectories of Marxian economies and their class and exploita-
tion structures as defined by Roemer [18, 19]. It is therefore appropriate, at
least as a first step, to adopt a theoretical framework as close as possible to
Roemer’s, including - crucially - his Marxian equilibrium concept.
For any (p, w), the profit rate at t is pit =
pt−pt−1A−wtL
pt−1A
. Given the struc-
ture of the economy, we shall focus on equilibria with strictly positive prices,
so that the profit rate is well defined at all t.3 By constraints (1)-(2), it im-
mediately follows that at any RS, only (pt, wt) matter for individual choices
at all t and so we can take the produced commodity as the nume´raire, setting
pt = 1, all t.
4 Let the normalised price vector be denoted as (1, ŵ), where
1 = (1, 1, ...) and, at any t, ŵt is the real wage rate and pit =
1−A−ŵtL
A
. In
what follows, with a slight abuse in notation, in the analysis of individual
choices at t, we shall simply refer to the price vector (1, ŵt).
Given the previous observations, by constraints (1)-(2), it follows that at
any RS, for all ν ∈ N and all t, the following equation must hold
ωνt = [1− A− ŵtL] (xνt + yνt ) + (ŵt − b) (Lxνt + zνt ) + ωνt−1. (4)
Equation (4) has a number of implications.5 First, it is immediate to
prove that at any RS, if ωt−1 > 0, then ŵt = b and pit = 0, all t. Next,
Lemma 1 proves that if the profit rate is strictly positive, then all wealth
is used productively and if the wage rate is above the minimum standard b,
then the labour constraint (3) binds, for all agents at the solution to MP νt .
Lemma 1: Let
(
(1, ŵ) , (ξν )ν∈N
)
be a RS for E0. At any t: if pit > 0, then
A (xνt + y
ν
t ) = ω
ν
t−1, all ν ∈ N ; and if ŵt > b, then Lxνt + zνt = lν , all ν ∈ N .
Next, it is possible to derive an explicit expression for the value of MP νt
and for the growth rate of capital, gν
t
, for all agents.
Lemma 2: Let
(
(1, ŵ) , (ξν )ν∈N
)
be a RS for E0. Then V
ν
t
(
ωνt−1; (1, ŵt)
)
=
(1 + pit)ω
ν
t−1 + (ŵt − b) lν , and gνt = pit + (ŵt − b) l
ν
ωνt−1
, for all ν ∈ N .
Lemma 2 has some interesting implications concerning the dynamics of
accumulation. Let pimax ≡ 1−A−bL
A
. Firstly, at all t, the aggregate growth
3It immediately follows from MP νt that if there is some t
′ such that pt′ = 0, then at
any RS it must be pt = 0 for all t > t
′.
4Differences in beginning-of-period prices, pt−1, and end-of-period prices, pt, are incon-
sequential for agents’ choices. At the beginning of t, given pt−1 and the expected (pt, wt),
for every unit of wealth stored to be sold at the end of t one foregoes A−1 units of output
produced at the end of t. Therefore one will invest productively (rather than storing the
good) provided (pt − wtL)A−1 = pt: beginning of period prices do not enter the decision.
5Lemmas 1 and 2 follow immediately from equation (4) and so their proofs are omitted.
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rate of the economy is gt = pit + (ŵt − b) lωt−1 . Hence, if l = LA−1ωt−1, then
gt = pi
max, and if ŵt = b, then g
ν
t
= gt = pi
max, for all ν ∈ N such that
ωνt−1 > 0. Secondly, if ŵt > b, then for any ν, µ ∈ N , gνt > gµt if and only
if l
ν
ωνt−1
> l
µ
ωµt−1
. Finally, if pit = 0 then g
ν
t
= (1−vb)
v
lν
ωνt−1
, for all ν ∈ N such
that ωνt−1 > 0, and gt =
(1−vb)
v
l
ωt−1
. Therefore, if there exists t′ = 1 such that
pit = 0 for all t = t′, then the growth rate of the basic economy decreases
over time and tends asymptotically to zero.
Lemma 3 derives a useful property of the set of solutions of MP νt .
Lemma 3: Let (1, ŵ) be a given price vector such that pit = 0 and ŵt =
b, some t. If ξνt solves MP
ν
t , then ξ
′ν
t ∈ R4+ also solves MP νt whenever
x′νt + y
′ν
t = x
ν
t + y
ν
t and z
′ν
t − Ly′νt = zνt − Lyνt .
Proof: It is easy to check that ξ′νt satisfies constraints (1)-(2). Moreover,
labour performed is the same in ξνt and ξ
′ν
t , since L (x
′ν
t + y
′ν
t )+(z
′ν
t − Ly′νt ) =
L (xνt + y
ν
t ) + (z
ν
t − Lyνt ). Then the result follows from equation (4).
Lemma 3 implies that if (xνt ; y
ν
t ; z
ν
t ; δ
ν
t ) solves MP
ν
t , then there is another
vector (0; y′νt ; z
′ν
t ; δ
ν
t ) which solves MP
ν
t . In the simulations, this allows us
to select one of the many potential solutions of MP νt by setting x
ν
t = 0 for
all ν ∈ N .6
Theorem 1 characterises the equilibria of the economy.
Theorem 1: Let
(
(1, ŵ) , (ξν )ν∈N
)
be a RS for E0. At any t:
(i) If pit > 0 and ŵt > b, then l = LA
−1ωt−1. Furthermore, for any (1, ŵ′t)
such that pi′t = 0 and ŵ′t = b, (ξνt )ν∈N also satisfies conditions (a)-(d) of
Definition 1;
(ii) If l > LA−1ωt−1 > 0 then ŵt = b;
(iii) If l < LA−1ωt−1 then pit = 0.
Proof: Part (i). By Lemma 1, A (xνt + y
ν
t ) = ω
ν
t−1 and Lx
ν
t + z
ν
t = l
ν , for all
ν ∈ N . Therefore, A (xt + yt) = ωt−1 and, by Definition 1(c), L (xt + yt) =
Lxt+zt = l. Since (xt + yt) = A
−1ωt−1, we have L (xt + yt) = LA−1ωt−1 = l.
To prove the second part of the statement, take any (1, ŵ′t) such that pi
′
t = 0
and ŵ′t = b. Then, it is immediate to show that ξνt solves MP νt at (1, ŵ′t) for
all ν and (ξνt )ν∈N satisfies conditions (b)-(d) of Definition 1 by assumption.
6It is important to stress that this choice has no implications whatsoever for the analysis
of exploitation and class, because - as shown in section 4 - the exploitation and class status
of agents do not depend on the specific solution to MP νt considered.
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Part (ii). By contradiction. Suppose that ŵt > b. Then, for all ν ∈ N ,
by (2), A (xνt + y
ν
t ) 5 ωνt−1 and by Lemma 1, Lxνt + zνt = lν . But, since
l > LA−1ωt−1, Lyt < zt holds, contradicting Definition 1(c). Hence ŵt = b.
Part (iii). By contradiction. Suppose that pit > 0. Then, for all ν ∈ N ,
by (3), Lxνt + z
ν
t 5 lν and by Lemma 1, A (xνt + yνt ) = ωνt−1. But, since
l < LA−1ωt−1, Lyt > zt holds, contradicting Definition 1(c). Hence pit = 0.
Theorem 1 defines the theoretical framework for the analysis of the dy-
namics of the economy. Although it only identifies necessary conditions for
the existence of a RS, it does shed some light on how to construct the dynamic
general equilibria. Consider part (ii) of the proof. Suppose l > LA−1ωt−1,
some t. If ŵt = b, then pit > 0 and labour performed does not produce
any net income for accumulation, and for all ν ∈ N , any (0; yνt ; zνt ; 0) with
Ayνt = ω
ν
t−1 solves MP
ν
t . Therefore since Ayt = ωt−1 and l > LA
−1ωt−1, we
can choose a suitable profile (zνt )ν∈N such that Lyt = zt and all conditions of
Definition 1 are satisfied at t.
Consider part (iii) of the proof. Suppose l < LA−1ωt−1, some t. If pit = 0,
then ŵt > b and capital holders are indifferent between using their wealth
productively and just carrying it for sale at the end of the period, and for
all ν ∈ N , any (0; yνt ; zνt ; δνt ) with zνt = lν solves MP νt . Therefore since
zt = l and l < LA
−1ωt−1, we can choose a suitable profile (yνt )ν∈N such that
Lyt = zt and all conditions of Definition 1 are satisfied at t.
4 Exploitation and Class in the Accumula-
tion Economy
The concept of exploitation in the accumulation economy can now be in-
troduced. In what follows, exploitation status is defined in every period t:
this is a natural assumption if the model describes a series of one-period
economies, otherwise it reflects a focus on within period exploitation.7 Un-
like in subsistence economies, focusing on the bundle consumed by an agent
may be misleading as both poor and rich agents consume b per unit of labour
expended, but their potential consumption is very different. Definition 2 iden-
tifies exploitation status in terms of the bundles of goods that an agent can
purchase with her income. More precisely, for all ν ∈ N and all (pt−1, pt, wt),
let cνt satisfy ptc
ν
t = V
ν
t
(
W νt−1; (pt−1, pt, wt)
)
+ ptbΛ
ν
t − ptωνt−1. Then
7For a discussion of within period and whole life exploitation, see Veneziani [22, 23].
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Definition 2 [Roemer [19]]: Agent ν is exploited at t if and only if Λνt > vc
ν
t ;
she is an exploiter if and only if Λνt < vc
ν
t ; and she is neither exploited nor
an exploiter if and only if Λνt = vc
ν
t .
Theorem 2 characterises the exploitation status of every agent, based on
their wealth per unit of labour performed
W νt−1
Λνt
:
Theorem 2: Let
(
(1, ŵ) , (ξν )ν∈N
)
be a RS for E0. At any t, if pit > 0:
(i) agent ν is an exploiter ⇔ W νt−1
Λνt
> 1
pit
[1−ŵtv]
v
;
(ii) agent ν is exploited ⇔ W νt−1
Λνt
< 1
pit
[1−ŵtv]
v
;
(iii) agent ν is neither exploited nor an exploiter ⇔ W νt−1
Λνt
= 1
pit
[1−ŵtv]
v
.
Proof: By Lemma 2, V νt
(
W νt−1; (1, ŵt)
)
= (1 + pit)W
ν
t−1 + (ŵt − b) lν , which
in turn implies that cνt = pitW
ν
t−1 + (ŵt − b) lν + bΛνt , for all t and all ν ∈ N .
Therefore for any ŵt = b, using Lemma 1, cνt = pitW νt−1+ŵtΛνt , for all t and all
ν ∈ N . But then agent ν is an exploiter if and only if v (pitW νt−1 + ŵtΛνt ) >
Λνt , and the first part of the statement follows from simple algebraic manip-
ulations. The other two parts follow in like manner.
Theorem 2 generalises analogous results by Roemer [19], as it charac-
terises the exploitation status of all agents also in economies with unem-
ployed labour. If Λνt = l
ν , all ν ∈ N , then by Theorem 2 exploitation status
is determined by the ratio of capital and labour endowments as in Roemer
[19]. If the economy is characterised by unemployed labour, however, Λνt < l
ν
for at least some ν ∈ N and exploitation status is determined by the ratio
of the capital endowment and labour performed,
W νt−1
Λνt
.
Observe that Theorem 2 holds if pit > 0. If pit = 0 then ŵt = (1/v) > b
and Λνt = vc
ν
t for all ν ∈ N and no exploitation exists in the economy.
This correspondence between profits and exploitation is a standard result in
Marxian theory (for a discussion, see Veneziani and Yoshihara [27]).
Following Roemer [19], classes can be defined based on the way in which
agents relate to the means of production.8 Let (a1, a2, a3) be a vector where
ai ∈ {+, 0}, i = 1, 2, 3, where “+” means a positive entry. In every t, agent
ν is said to be a member of class (a1, a2, a3), if there is ξ
ν
t = (x
ν
t ; y
ν
t ; z
ν
t ; δ
ν
t ) ∈
Aν (1, ŵt) such that (xνt ; yνt ; zνt ) has the form (a1, a2, a3). The notation (+,+, 0)
implies, for instance, that an agent works in her own ‘shop’ and hires others
to work for her; (+, 0,+) implies that an agent works both in her own ‘shop’
8Again, observe that we focus on within period classes (see Veneziani [22, 23]).
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and for others; and so on. Although there are eight conceivable classes, only
the following four are theoretically relevant.
C1t = {ν ∈ N | Aν (1, ŵt) has a solution of the form (+,+, 0) \ (+, 0, 0)} ,
C2t = {ν ∈ N | Aν (1, ŵt) has a solution of the form (+, 0, 0)} ,
C3t = {ν ∈ N | Aν (1, ŵt) has a solution of the form (+, 0,+) \ (+, 0, 0)} ,
C4t = {ν ∈ N | Aν (1, ŵt) has a solution of the form (0, 0,+)} .
The notation (a1, a2, a3)\ (a′1, a′2, a′3) means that agent ν is a member of class
(a1, a2, a3) but not of class (a
′
1, a
′
2, a
′
3).
Theorem 3 proves that C1t −C4t represent a partition of the set of agents.
Theorem 3: Let
(
(1, ŵ) , (ξν )ν∈N
)
be a RS for E0. At any t, if pit > 0:
(i) ν ∈ (+,+, 0)\(+, 0, 0) ⇔ Lyνt > zνt for all ξνt ∈ Aν (1, ŵt) ;
(ii) ν ∈ (+, 0, 0) ⇔ Lyνt = zνt for some ξνt ∈ Aν (1, ŵt) ;
(iii) ν ∈ (+, 0,+)\(+, 0, 0) ⇔ Lyνt < zνt for all ξνt ∈ Aν (1, ŵt) ;
(iv) ν ∈ (0, 0,+) ⇔ W νt−1 = 0.
Proof: 1. If pit > 0, then by Lemma 1, for all ν ∈ N , A (xνt + yνt ) = ωνt−1
for all ξνt ∈ Aν (1, ŵt). Therefore ν ∈ (0, 0,+) implies W νt−1 = 0. Conversely,
it is easy to see that for all ŵt = b, if W νt−1 = 0, then ν ∈ (0, 0,+).
2. Consider agents with W νt−1 > 0. By the convexity of MP
ν
t , if Ly
ν
t > z
ν
t
for some ξνt ∈ Aν (1, ŵt) and Ly′νt < z′νt for some ξ′νt ∈ Aν (1, ŵt), then there
is ξ′′νt ∈ Aν (1, ŵt) such that Ly′′νt = z′′νt . Therefore, for all agents with
W νt−1 > 0: either Ly
ν
t > z
ν
t for all ξ
ν
t ∈ Aν (1, ŵt); or Lyνt < zνt for all
ξνt ∈ Aν (1, ŵt); or Lyνt = zνt for some ξνt ∈ Aν (1, ŵt). The latter are
mutually exclusive and exhaustive cases.
3. Part (i). Suppose Lyνt > z
ν
t for all ξ
ν
t ∈ Aν (1, ŵt). Consider two
cases:
Case 1 : ŵt > b. By Lemma 1, at all ξ
ν
t ∈ Aν (1, ŵt), it must be
A (xνt + y
ν
t ) = ω
ν
t−1 and Lx
ν
t +z
ν
t = l
ν . From the first equation it follows that
Lxνt + Ly
ν
t = LA
−1ωνt−1 and so we have LA
−1ωνt−1 − Lyνt = lν − zνt . Since
Lyνt > z
ν
t for all ξ
ν
t ∈ Aν (1, ŵt), then LA−1ωνt−1 > lν .
Consider ξ′νt = (x
′ν
t ; y
′ν
t ; 0; 0) such that Lx
′ν
t = l
ν , and x′νt + y
′ν
t = x
ν
t + y
ν
t .
Note that y′νt = A
−1ωνt−1−L−1lν > 0 and so noting that z′νt −Ly′νt = zνt −Lyνt ,
by Lemma 3 it follows that ξ′νt ∈ Aν (1, ŵt). Hence, ν ∈ (+,+, 0).
It remains to show that ν /∈ (+, 0, 0). Suppose, by way of contradiction,
that there is ξνt = (x
ν
t ; 0; 0; 0) ∈ Aν (1, ŵt). Since pit > 0, then by Lemma 1,
Axνt = ω
ν
t−1 and so Lx
ν
t = LA
−1ωνt−1 > l
ν , a contradiction.
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Case 2 : ŵt = b. In this case, any ξ
ν
t such that δ
ν
t = 0, A (x
ν
t + y
ν
t ) = ω
ν
t−1,
and Lxνt + z
ν
t 5 lν , solves MP νt . Therefore, it is immediate to see that
ν ∈ (+,+, 0). Further, ξνt =
(
0;A−1ωνt−1; l
ν ; 0
) ∈ Aν (1, ŵt), and therefore
Lyνt > z
ν
t for all ξ
ν
t ∈ Aν (1, ŵt) implies LA−1ωνt−1 > lν . Hence the same
argument as in Case 1 can be used to prove ν /∈ (+, 0, 0).
4. Parts (ii) and (iii) are proved similarly.
Theorem 3 characterises the class structure of the accumulating economy,
based on the way in which agents relate to the means of production. An
immediate implication of Theorem 3 is that the class status of each agent is
related to her productive endowments.
Corollary 1: Let
(
(1, ŵ) , (ξν )ν∈N
)
be a RS for E0. Consider any t with pit >
0. Then, ν ∈ C1t ⇔ LA−1ωνt−1 > lν and ν ∈ C4t ⇔ W νt−1 = 0. Furthermore,
if ŵt > b, then ν ∈ C2t ⇔ LA−1ωνt−1 = lν and ν ∈ C3t ⇔ LA−1ωνt−1 < lν ;
whereas if ŵt = b, then ν ∈ C2t ⇔ LA−1ωνt−1 5 lν and C3t = ∅.
A fundamental insight of Marxian exploitation theory is the existence
of a tight relation between class positions and exploitation status. This is
formalised in the next principle.9
Class-Exploitation Correspondence Principle (CECP) [Roemer [19]]:
Given any economy E0, at any RS and any t, if pit > 0:
(A) every member of C1t is an exploiter.
(B) every member of C3t ∪ C4t such that Λνt > 0 is exploited.
The next result proves that the CECP holds in the accumulation economies
considered in this paper.
Theorem 4 (CECP): Let
(
(1, ŵ) , (ξν )ν∈N
)
be a RS for E0. At any t, such
that pit > 0, if ν ∈ C1t then ν is an exploiter and if ν ∈ C3t ∪ C4t with Λνt > 0
then ν is exploited. Furthermore, if ŵt > b then:
ν ∈ C1t ⇔ ν is an exploiter;
ν ∈ C2t ⇔ ν is neither exploited nor an exploiter;
ν ∈ C3t ∪ C4t ⇔ ν is exploited.
Proof: 1. If ŵt > b, then the result follows immediately from Corollary 1
and Theorem 2, noting that by Lemma 1, Λνt = l
ν and 1
pit
[1−ŵtv]
v
= A
L
.
9In part (B), we impose the condition that agents in the lower classes spend some of
their time working. This is a theoretically appropriate restriction since the exploitation
status of agents who do not engage in any economic activities is unclear.
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2. Suppose that ŵt = b. By Corollary 1, ν ∈ C3t ∪ C4t ⇔ W νt−1 = 0.
Hence by Theorem 2, if Λνt > 0, then ν is exploited. Further, by Corollary
1, ν ∈ C1t ⇔ LA−1ωνt−1 > lν . Noting that W
ν
t−1
Λνt
= W
ν
t−1
lν
> A
L
= 1
pit
[1−ŵtv]
v
, the
result follows from Theorem 2.
Theorem 4 confirms the standard Marxist insight that agents in the upper
classes are exploiters and agents in the lower classes are exploited.
5 An index of exploitation
The relation between class and exploitation status derived in the previous
section provides some interesting normative insights on the structural in-
justices characterising capitalist economies, as Roemer [19] has forcefully
argued. Yet, an exclusive focus on classes and on the sets of exploiters and
exploited agents, as well as on the CECP, yields a rather partial, coarse pic-
ture of the structure of exploitative relations: two economies with similar
numbers of agents belonging to each class and each exploitation category
may still be very different. Based on Definition 2, it is possible to extend
the normative reach of the concept of exploitation and provide a finer and
more comprehensive picture of exploitative relations. For Definition 2 allows
us to move beyond a purely aggregate analysis and explore the exploitation
status of every agent. This immediately raises the issue of the measurement
of the intensity of exploitation, both at the individual and at the aggregate
level. It is certainly desirable to have a notion of exploitation that allows
us to make statements such as “agent A is less exploited than agent B”,
or “Economy C is more exploitative than economy D”, or “Economy E is
becoming increasingly exploitative over time”.
Definition 2 states that exploitation status is determined according to
whether Λνt ≷ vcνt . Therefore a natural index of the intensity of exploitation
of any agent ν ∈ Nt in period t is:
eνt =
Λνt
vcνt
,
where eνt ∈ [0,∞), and eνt can be interpreted as the rate of labour sup-
plied relative to the labour necessary to obtain one unit of consumption.
From this perspective, exploitative relations are equivalent to inequalities in
labour hours supplied to earn one unit of income (measured in the labour
nume´raire) and the notion of exploitation is normatively relevant in that
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eνt can be interpreted as a well-being index capturing access to some fun-
damental primary goods, namely economic resources (or commodities) and
free hours. The profile (eνt )ν∈Nt then measures the distribution of access to
resources and free hours and so of opportunity for well-being.
Agent ν is exploited if and only if eνt > 1, but, assuming e
ν
t to be a
meaningful cardinal and interpersonally comparable measure, a much richer
analysis of exploitative relations is possible. For example, one can say that
the greater eνt the more exploited ν is and, for any ν,µ ∈ Nt, if eνt > eµt > 1
then ν is more exploited than µ. And similarly for exploiters. More gener-
ally, we can analyse the distribution of eνt at a given point in time, as well as
its evolution over time, and ask questions about the exploitation structure
of the economy. A more polarised distribution of eνt , for instance, suggests
an increase in the intensity of exploitation. Interestingly, the mathematical
structure of the profile (eνt )ν∈Nt is similar to that of income or wealth dis-
tributions, and so the measurement of the aggregate degree of exploitation
raises similar issues as the measurement of income or wealth inequalities. Be-
low, we provide a complete description of the (dynamics of the) distribution
of eνt . We also trace the evolution of the associated Gini index, interpreted as
one example of a summary measure of the aggregate degree of exploitation.
6 The dynamics of the basic model
This section analyses the basic model computationally. The aim is to illus-
trate the relevance of the theoretical results derived above and to rigorously
describe the dynamics of exploitation and class in the benchmark case. This
section also provides the basic formal and computational framework for the
analysis of more complex economies below.
The simulation begins with data on (N ; (A,L) ; b; Π,Ω0). The benchmark
set of parameters is: N = 100, A = 0.5, L = 0.25, b = 1.9, and lν = 1, for
all ν ∈ N .10 Aggregate initial capital is ω0 = 25, so that l > LA−1ω0 holds
and the economy is initially capital constrained, starting far from the knife-
edge condition l = LA−1ωt−1. This is important in order to examine the
existence and evolution of exploitation and classes over time: by Theorem
1, the knife-edge condition identifies a ceiling to capital accumulation as it
provides an upper bound to the aggregate amount of capital compatible with
the existence of positive profits and exploitation.
10Therefore vtbt = vb < 1 all t and the productivity condition is satisfied throughout
the simulation. The same holds in all of the models below.
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The distribution of aggregate capital is determined in order to mimic
the empirical wealth distribution in the U.S. (Allegretto [3]). In all of our
simulations, ω0 is distributed such that there are five groups of agents. The
first group comprises 50-70% of the total population and each ν in this group
is assigned ων0 = 0.
11 The top 1% of agents are assigned 40% of ω0, the next
4% are assigned 30% of ω0, the next 15% are assigned 20%, and the remaining
10% of ω0 is distributed to whatever agents remain (10%-30% of N).
This parameterisation represents our benchmark in all simulations, unless
otherwise stated.12 It is worth stressing at the outset that the values chosen
are empirically reasonable, but - as shown in section 9 below - our key insights
are robust to different choices of the initial values of the key parameters.
Concerning agents, by Lemma 3, we restrict the computational analysis
to solutions of MP νt for all ν and t of the form (0; y
ν
t ; z
ν
t ; δ
ν
t ). To be specific, at
any t, we set ξνt =
(
0;A−1ωνt−1;
LA−1ωt−1
l
lν ; 0
)
, ξνt =
(
0; l
LA−1ωt−1
A−1ωνt−1; l
ν ;(
1− l
LA−1ωt−1
)
ωνt−1
)
, or ξνt =
(
0;A−1ωνt−1; l
ν ; 0
)
, for all ν, depending on
whether the economy is capital constrained, labour constrained, or on the
knife-edge. In all of our simulations, this specification of agents’ optimal
choices guarantees that the conditions in Definition 1 are always satisfied.13
The simulation runs for T = 50 periods. The simulation first checks
whether the economy is capital constrained, labour constrained, or on the
knife-edge and updates ŵt accordingly. Once ŵt is determined, pit is known
and the agents then solve MP νt . The agents’ endowments are updated ac-
cording to equation (4) and the simulation then repeats as necessary.14
The results of the simulation over T can be found in Figures 1-3. Figure
1 reports the aggregate activity levels (xt, yt, zt, δt), aggregate net output
(1− A) yt, net output per capita (1− A) yt/N , wealth Wt−1, the growth rate
of capital gt, ŵt and b, and pit. In all panels, the dashed vertical line denotes
the period in which the economy becomes labour constrained.
11The number of agents assigned to this group is randomly drawn from a uniform dis-
tribution.
12The procedure to determine the initial wealth distribution is the same in all simula-
tions. While the initial distributions differ across models due to different starting points in
relation to the knife-edge and to the randomness built into the procedure, the differences
are sufficiently small that the results are unaffected and can be compared across models.
13See section 1 of the Addendum. As already noted, the focus on these solutions has
no implications for any of the results or conclusions in the paper. This is because the
exploitation and class status of agents, the distribution of the exploitation intensity index,
income and wealth, as well as the the dynamics of consumption, technical change, and
accumulation do not depend on the specific solution to the optimisation problem analysed.
14All simulations are done using Mathematica version 10.
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Figure 1: Summary results - Basic model
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Figure 2(a) reports the dynamics of exploitation by providing a headcount
of the agents who are exploiters, exploited, or neither. Clearly, the exploita-
tion status of agents is constant while the economy is capital constrained and
exploitation ceases to exist once it becomes labour constrained. Figure 2(b)
captures the class composition of the economy. The pattern of C1t and C
2
t is
interesting and reveals the relation between endowments and class status: at
the beginning of the simulation, a relatively low level of capital implies that
for a number of agents labour demand (Lyνt ) is lower than labour endow-
ment (lν), placing them into C2t . As accumulation progresses, however, their
labour demand grows and they eventually join C1t .
15 Figure 2(c) illustrates
Theorem 4 and shows the existence of a robust correspondence between class
and exploitation status (until the economy becomes labour constrained).
Figure 3 provides a complete description of the distribution of the ex-
ploitation intensity index, eνt , over the course of the simulation. Prior to the
economy becoming labour constrained, the distribution of eνt is constant over
time: there is no tendency for exploitation to diminish. When the economy
becomes labour constrained, profits and exploitation disappear, and one can
observe that eνt = 1, all ν ∈ N . Interestingly, agents in the lower classes
are exploited to somewhat different degrees. All agents in C4t are exploited
with equal intensity, since they all have zero endowments and work the same
amount. The exploitation status of agents in C2t is not obvious instead: some
of them are indeed exploited (albeit less than members of C4t ) but agents at
the upper end of C2t are exploiters (albeit less than members of C
1
t ).
Figure 3 displays a relatively low dispersion of the exploitation index.
This is due to the fact that, unlike in actual economies, all agents perform
the same amount of labour and, in the capital constrained phase, the given
parameterisation (in particular the rather high value of b) yields a low profit
rate. Different values of the parameters, or a heterogeneous allocation of
labour (perhaps inversely proportional to wealth, in order to reflect class
differences) lead to a much higher dispersion (see section 9 below).16
Figure 4(a) shows the Gini coefficient of wealth. The index remains con-
stant as long as exploitation exists, because all agents in the middle and
upper classes accumulate at the same rate, and so their relative positions in
the wealth distribution remain unchanged, even though they become increas-
ingly wealthier than propertyless agents in C4t . Once the economy becomes
labour constrained and exploitation ceases, the Gini coefficient monotonically
15In Figure 2(b), and in all similar figures below, the class composition of the economy
is shown only for the periods t with pit > 0, consistently with Theorem 3 and Corollary 1.
16The Gini coefficient of (eνt )v∈N is constant and equal to 0.0284712 until the economy
becomes labour constrained, when it drops to zero.
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Figure 2: Class and exploitation status - Basic model
(a) Exploitation status (b) Class status
(c) CECP
decreases and asymptotically approaches zero. The same pattern emerges in
Figure 4(b) where the whole wealth distribution is shown for select t (before
and after the end of exploitation).
In summary, the results of the basic model confirm that exploitation and
classes are meaningful concepts to analyse the economic and social structure
of capitalist economies, and the distribution of the exploitation intensity
index yields interesting normative insights. They also confirm, however, that
in an accumulation economy, absent any countervailing forces, exploitation
disappears over time as profits vanish. Our next step, therefore, is to extend
the basic model in order to explore the mechanisms that could lead to the
persistence of exploitation in the presence of accumulation.
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Figure 3: Exploitation intensity index - Basic model
Figure 4: Distribution of wealth - Basic model
(a) Gini coefficient of wealth
(b) Distribution of wealth for select t (relative frequency)
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7 On the persistent abundance of labour
In this section, we extend the basic model in order to incorporate techni-
cal change and a variable population. This choice reflects both empirical
and theoretical concerns. Empirically, the long-run evolution of capitalist
economies has indeed been characterised by a tendential expansion of tech-
nical knowledge, leading to a progressive increase in labour productivity (see
Flaschel et al. [10]), and by significant population movements.
Theoretically, a fundamental feature of capitalism as a dynamic system
is its constant tendency to revolutionise production, and it is certainly re-
strictive to assume technology to remain constant over time. Furthermore,
in classical-Marxian approaches, population growth and, especially, labour-
saving technical change have traditionally been considered two of the key
mechanisms for maintaining labour abundant relative to capital.
Because we are interested in the effect of technical progress and popu-
lation flows on the dynamics of exploitation and classes, in this section we
keep our analysis as simple as possible and assume that technical knowledge
and population grow at exogenously given, historically plausible, rates. As
for technical change, we focus on labour-saving innovations that reduce Lt
at a constant rate.
In this section, we allow bt to vary over time, assuming that it keeps pace
with the growth rate of the economy. This is empirically reasonable as the
long-run evolution of capitalist economies has indeed been characterised by
an increase in (average) consumption opportunities and consumption norms
have evolved over time. It also reflects the Marxian insights on the social
nature of consumption and the idea that consumption norms depend on the
general level of development of the economy.17
To be specific, we assume that consumption norms grow at the same
rate as aggregate capital - our proxy for the level of development of the
economy. This allows the economy to settle on a steady growth path but it is
important to emphasise that none of our insights on profits, exploitation and
class depends on this specification. For example, all of our key conclusions
continue to hold if consumption norms depend on labour productivity, rather
than wealth,18 or indeed, if consumption norms do not change at all.
17The co-evolution of accumulation and workers’ consumption is sometimes considered
to be one of the defining features of historical trajectories of capitalist economies a` la Marx
(Dume´nil and Levy [8], p.206).
18We are grateful to an anonymous referee, for suggesting labour productivity as an
alternative proxy for the level of development of the economy.
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7.1 Simulation results
In our simulations, we start with At, Lt, bt, and Nt at the same values as
in section 6: A0 = 0.5, L0 = 0.25, b0 = 1.9, and N0 = 100. As in the basic
model lνt = 1 for all ν ∈ Nt and all t. The initial distribution of endowments
Ω0 is handled as in section 6, with ω0 = 25, so that l > L1A
−1
1 ω0 and the
economy is capital constrained at the start of the simulation.
As the simulation unfolds, Lt is reduced by 2 percent during each t, while
At remains constant, so that labour productivity increases constantly. This
parameterisation is very close to the OECD estimates of the average annual
growth rate of productivity for advanced countries during 1971-2014 and is
generally consistent with empirical evidence on the long-run dynamics of
labour productivity in the U.S. and in other high income countries (see, for
example, Wolff [29],[30]). The growth rate of population, Nt, is chosen to be
roughly 1 percent,19 consistent with the UN Population Division estimates
of the average annual population growth rates for upper middle- and high-
income countries since World War II. As we argue in section 9, however, our
results are robust to alternative choices of both growth rates.
Finally, the evolution of consumption norms closely maps the develop-
ment of the economy. To be precise, the growth rate of bt is proportional to
the rate of accumulation:
bt − bt−1
bt−1
= φ
ωt−1 − ωt−2
ωt−2
.
In this section, we assume that φ = 1. We discuss the more general case in
section 9 below.
The simulation occurs in the following order: (1) initialisation, t = 1;
(2) bt is updated; (3) Nt is updated; (4) ŵt is determined; (5) Lt and pit are
updated; (6) agents solve MP νt ; and (7) the sequence (2)-(6) is repeated for
T , with T = 500.
The results are depicted in Figures 5-9(b). Figure 5 reports the same
information as Figure 1 for the basic model. Some differences between Fig-
ures 1 and 5 emerge, notably concerning the dynamics of net output, wealth,
and labour performed. One striking feature of the model is the extremely
rapid convergence to a steady growth path. Thus, net output and wealth
grow over the course of the simulation (as driven by yt), but zt remains fairly
steady, starting at 12.5 and settling at 12.8894 after t = 4. This is because
at all t, zt = LtA
−1ωt−1 and gt quickly settles at a constant level such that
19The population growth rate is approximate because the population must be rounded
to the nearest integer.
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1 + Lt+1−Lt
Lt
= 1
1+gt
, all t. On the steady growth path the economy remains
capital constrained. Therefore ŵt = bt , all t, and there is a secular increase in
consumption (and wages) from b0 = 1.9 to b
max = 46, 801.9, and, as expected
from Lemma 2, pit settles at pit = pi
max
t = gt = 0.0204082 for t > 5. Figure 6
shows the dynamics of At, Lt, and labour values.
As predicted, labour-saving technical change and population growth allow
exploitation and classes to persist by maintaining capital scarcity relative
to labour, and therefore a positive profit rate despite the increase in the
consumption norm, bt, and so in the equilibrium real wage rate.
Figures 7(a)-7(b) clearly show the persistence of exploitation and classes.20
Indeed, they portray an extreme polarisation of exploitation and class sta-
tus. As accumulation proceeds, propertyless agents arrive in the economy
and drive the proportion of exploited agents and the share of agents in C4t
up, while the number of agents in C1t and C
2
t remains constant, and so their
proportion decreases, together with the share of exploiters. Remarkably, the
economy displays no class mobility: because ŵt = bt for all t, agents who start
in C4t remain in C
4
t , and because Lt decreases and y
ν
t increases such that Lty
ν
t
remains constant, agents who begin in C1t and C
2
t also remain in their re-
spective classes for all t. Figure 7(c) confirms that the CECP continues to
hold in the more general economy considered here.
Figures 8(a)-8(b) provide information about the distribution of the ex-
ploitation intensity index eνt which reinforces these conclusions. Given the
significant growth in population over T = 500, Figure 8(a) shows the distri-
bution of eνt by percentile for all t. Agents with e
ν
t < 1 can be seen during
the first half of the simulation, but their numbers decline as the population
grows and a consistently larger percentage of agents exhibit eνt > 1. Figure
8(b) shows, interestingly, that the Gini of eνt decreases over time. This is
not because exploitation is disappearing from the economy; it is an artifact
of the way in which Gini coefficients are constructed. The ever-increasing
number of agents with ωνt−1 = 0 leads to the vast majority of agents having
identical, high values of eνt , which lowers the Gini of e
ν
t . Given the clear
pattern of increasing polarisation emerging from Figures 7(a)-7(b) and 8(a),
this suggests that the Gini coefficient may not be the best index of the de-
gree of exploitation in the economy, and it raises the interesting issue of the
appropriate aggregate measure of exploitative relations.
The wealth distribution displays a similar pattern. Figure 9(a) shows that
20Unlike in the previous model, given the changing population over time, in this section
(and in the next) the charts reporting class and exploitation status show the percentage
of the population at all t belonging to a given class or exploitation classification.
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Figure 5: Summary results - Model with exogenous technical change and
population growth
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Figure 6: Technology and labour values - Model with exogenous technical
change and population growth
the Gini coefficient of wealth increases monotonically and asymptotically ap-
proaches one, with a final value of 0.999126. The extreme polarisation is also
evident when looking at snapshots of the whole distribution of wealth for se-
lect t as in Figure 9(b). The severe initial wealth inequalities are exacerbated
over time until the percentage of agents with ωνt−1 > 0 is barely visible.
In summary, the results support the claim that labour-saving technical
change and population dynamics can contribute to explain the persistence
of exploitation in accumulation economies (Skillman [20]). Their key role in
this context is to make capital persistently scarce relative to labour. Labour
unemployment puts downward pressure on the real wage, keeping it at the
minimum socially acceptable level, and this implies that the vast majority of
agents remain propertyless. Even though the economic conditions of those
who have ‘nothing to lose but their chains’ improve over time, the class
and exploitation structure of the economy remains invariant - indeed, the
economy becomes increasingly polarised.
This is certainly an important insight but two important limitations of
the model should be noted which suggest to interpret the results with cau-
tion. First, given the nature of capitalist economies, and certainly from a
Marxian perspective, it is not entirely satisfactory to suppose technologi-
cal progress to be completely independent from prices and profitability. For
profit maximising behaviour leads capitalist firms to constantly search for
cost-reducing innovations, especially if they face the pressure of rising wage
costs. And a similar concern holds for population dynamics, which tends to
be responsive to economic conditions, especially (but not exclusively) in the
long run and if migration flows are taken into account.
Second, the results in this section are driven by a specific mechanism
to determine distributive variables: population growth and technical change
play a key role in creating labour unemployment which in turn forces the
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Figure 7: Class and exploitation status - Model with exogenous technical
change and population growth
(a) Exploitation status (b) Class status
(c) CECP
real wage down to the (socially determined and time-evolving) consumption
norm. This would seem to suggest that labour unemployment is a neces-
sary determinant of the persistence of exploitative relations. Yet it would be
important, both normatively and theoretically, to analyse exploitation and
class in economies with full employment. Marx’s theory of exploitation does
not crucially depend on the existence of unemployment and full employment
does not make capitalist economies non-exploitative. Further, given the ex-
tremely skewed asset distribution, the assumption of a perfectly competitive
labour market seems objectionable. With the richest portion of the popula-
tion holding the vast majority of wealth and employing an increasing mass
of propertyless agents, - and the issues of power and class solidarity that
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Figure 8: Exploitation intensity index - Model with exogenous technical
change and population growth
(a) Exploitation intensity across agents (b) Gini coefficient of eνt
(c) Distribution of eνt for select t (relative frequency)
this polarised wealth distribution raises, - it seems natural to analyse a more
complex model for the determination of the key distributive variables.
In the next section, we extend our analysis to explore the interplay
of accumulation, population growth, and technical change in more general
economies with full employment and generalised bargaining.
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Figure 9: Distribution of wealth - Model with exogenous technical change
and population growth
(a) Gini coefficient of wealth
(b) Distribution of wealth for select t (relative frequency)
8 Endogenous technical change with collec-
tive bargaining on wages and profits
In this section, we analyse exploitation and class in capitalist economies with
technical change and population growth, by focusing on dynamic paths char-
acterised by the full employment of labour. The key point to note is that
whenever the economy is at the knife-edge, with LtA
−1
t ωt−1 = lt, the equilib-
rium distribution is generally indeterminate.21 This allows us to explore the
effects of bargaining on exploitation and class.
21As pointed out by an anonymous referee, this exemplifies an indeterminacy that is
generic to the sequential temporary equilibria of linear economies. As Mandler [13, 14]
has shown, a linear sequence economy will often (and not by mere fluke) evolve toward
factor proportions such that all resource constraints are binding, rendering the temporary
equilibrium of its later periods indeterminate.
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8.1 The bargaining model
Consider any period t such that LtA
−1
t ωt−1 = lt. For given technology and
population, we assume that income distribution is determined by collective
bargaining at the beginning of t, before the production process starts. To be
specific, given pt = 1, the bargaining game S (At, Lt) is defined as
22
S (At, Lt) ≡ ∪ŵt∈[b, 1vt ]
{
(sνt )ν∈Nt | sνt 5 V νt
(
ωνt−1; (1, ŵt)
)
(∀ν ∈ Nt)
}
,
where V νt
(
ωνt−1; (1, ŵt)
)
= (1 + pit)ω
ν
t−1+(ŵt − b) lνt , all ν ∈ Nt, and so the set
of Pareto-optimal payoffs is identified by varying ŵt. Let σt ≡ (σνt )ν∈Nt ∈ RNt+
with
∑
ν∈Nt σ
ν
t = 1 be a profile of weights capturing the agents’ bargaining
power. The Nash bargaining solution N (σt) (S (At, Lt)) is:
23
N (σt) (S (At, Lt)) = arg max
ŵt∈
[
b, 1
vt
]∏ν∈Nt [V νt (ωνt−1; (1, ŵt))]σνt .
There are many conceivable ways of capturing agents’ bargaining power.
Different specifications yield different dynamics of income distributions and
exploitative relations. In what follows, we consider a large set of possibilities
by specifying the bargaining power of each agent ν ∈ Nt as follows:
σνt ≡ (1− )
ωνt−1
ωt−1
+ 
Nνt
Nt
, some  ∈ [0, 1] , (5)
where Nνt ≥ 1 is the number of agents who possess the same wealth as ν.
Formally, N νt ≡ #
{
ν ′ ∈ Nt | ων′t−1 = ωνt−1
}
.
Equation (5) incorporates some important insights of Marxian theory.
For it states that the bargaining power of each agent ν ∈ Nt depends partly
on the ownership of means of production (more precisely, on their share of
aggregate capital) and partly on the number of agents who share the same
objective condition as ν (in terms of capital ownership). Thus, bargaining
power derives either from economic resources, or from the ability of agents
in a similar condition to act collectively.
Equation (5) is very general. The weight  allows us to capture the
polar cases of economies with weak solidarity and low levels of organisation
22In this section, we focus on the bargaining procedure and assume again a constant b.
23We adopt the Nash solution as a technically convenient reduced-form approach to the
bargaining problem. As is common in the literature on non-cooperative implementation of
bargaining solutions, the Nash solution should be understood as the equilibrium outcome
of some underlying noncooperative bargaining procedure.
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( ≈ 0), and economies in which the power of capital and economic resources
is mitigated by collective action ( ≈ 1), as well as any intermediate scenarios.
If  = 0, then the bargaining power of each agent is proportional to her
share of aggregate capital: capitalists have all the bargaining power while
propertyless agents have no influence on the determination of wages and
profits. If  = 1, then - given a very skewed distribution of wealth - the richer
segments of the population have virtually no bargaining power: propertyless
agents constitute the majority of the population and play the main role in
determining bargaining outcomes.24
Let ŵN
(σt)
t ∈ N (σt) (S (At, Lt)): every ν ∈ Nt solves MP νt given the price
vector
(
1, ŵN
(σt)
t
)
, and given ((At, Lt) , b). Because LtA
−1
t ωt−1 = lt, it is
immediate to show that conditions (a)-(d) of Definition 1 are satisfied.
At the end of the period, both population and technological knowledge
are updated.
8.2 Population
We assume that economic growth drives population growth - for example,
by determining population flows in or out of the economy, or as part of a
general Malthusian mechanism. Formally, in each t, if the economy is at a
knife-edge equilibrium, then population in period t+ 1, lt+1, will be
lt+1 =
[
(1− bLt)A−1t
]
lt,
where
[
(1− bLt)A−1t
]
corresponds to the growth rate of capital at t and
can be interpreted, in a classical-Marxian fashion, as the natural rate of
population growth. For it is reasonable to assume that in a situation of full
utilisation of capital and labour, the growth rate of population adjusts to the
rate of capital accumulation.25
24Although wealth influences bargaining power, equation (5) does not imply that wealth-
ier agents’ obtain higher payoffs. First, in general, bargaining power does not depend only
on wealth and below we also consider scenarios in which wealth has no direct effect on bar-
gaining power ( = 1). Second, wealth enters also the definition of an agent’s bargaining
group and Nνt , and given a skewed wealth distribution, N
ν
t (and thus bargaining power)
is actually decreasing in wealth.
25If one allows for unemployed labour or capital, one could assume that if the economy
is capital constrained at t, then lt+1 <
[
(1− bLt)A−1t
]
lt; while if it is labour constrained
then lt+1 >
[
(1− bLt)A−1t
]
lt. In the former case, labour unemployment and a real wage
rate equal to the minimum consumption standard, imply that labour supply grows slowly.
In the latter case, a buoyant labour market and a high real wage, induce a high growth
rate of the population.
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8.3 Technical progress
We assume that when the profit rate falls below a certain threshold, capi-
talists increase their efforts to innovate and introduce new production tech-
niques. Formally, let piN
(σt)
t =
1−At−ŵN(σt)t Lt
At
be the profit rate resulting from
the bargaining process. Recall that Pt denotes the set of Leontief production
techniques (At, Lt) available to agents at t. Let (A
′, L′) denote a new tech-
nique emerging from the innovation process. We assume that there exists a
value of the profit rate pi∗ ∈ R+ that represents the capitalists’ minimum
profitability benchmark (which depends on economic, institutional and even
cultural factors) such that if piN
(σt)
t = pi∗, then Pt+1 = Pt, and no innovation
occurs. If, instead, piN
(σt)
t < pi
∗ then capitalists redouble their innovation and
R&D efforts, a new technique (A′, L′) is generated with probability λ 5 1
and Pt+1 = Pt ∪ (A′, L′). The new technique (A′, L′) has A′ = gAAt and
L′ = gLLt, gA, gL ∈ R2+ , and is adopted in period t + 1 only if it yields the
maximum profit rate.
This formulation of technical progress is both theoretically appropriate
and empirically reasonable. Theoretically, our model incorporates key in-
sights from both classical-Marxian and evolutionary analyses of technical
change, in that the innovation process is fundamentally profit-driven, and
innovations are both discontinuous and local.
Technical progress is profit-driven because only profitable changes are
adopted. This is a defining feature of the classical-Marxian framework, as
Dume´nil and Levy [8] have argued, but it is also a key assumption in the
Schumpeterian literature (see, for example, the classic papers by Nelson et
al. [16] and Aghion and Howitt [1]). But the innovation process is linked to
the trajectory of the profit rate also because significant declines in profitabil-
ity spur innovation activities and thus tend to yield changes in production
processes. This is consistent with standard Marxian insights, whereby “a
declining profit rate will lead at some point to a structural crisis, and ‘some-
thing’ will happen with respect to technical change” (Dume´nil and Levy
[8], p.203). But the Schumpeterian literature also emphasises the strongly
countercyclical nature of R&D investments both theoretically (Aghion and
Howitt [1]; Wa¨lde [28]) and empirically (Aghion et al. [2]).26
The discontinuous nature of technical change incorporates a Schumpete-
rian view of innovation as a jerky process (Nelson et al. [16]; Wa¨lde [28]).
Formally, our modelling of technical change can be interpreted either as the
reduced form - and limit point - of a more complex stochastic process whereby
26We thank Peter H. Matthews for alerting us to this literature.
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the likelihood of (profitable) innovations increases with R&D efforts, and the
latter increase as profitability decreases. But it can also be seen as incor-
porating satisficing behaviour conceptually analogous to that formalised by
Nelson et al. [16] in their classic evolutionary model of technical change in
which “Firms with positive capital in the current state retain the production
technique of that state, with probability one, if their currently calculated
gross return on capital exceeds 0.16. ... Firms that do not make a gross re-
turn of 0.16 undergo a probabilistic technique-change process.” ([16], p.95).
We also follow the classical-Marxian and evolutionary literature in as-
suming that innovations are local : agents do not have a global scan of al-
ternatives and search around existing processes (see, for example, Nelson et
al. [16]; Dume´nil and Levy [8]). Therefore when innovations occur, they
yield relatively small changes in technical coefficients. Consistently with this
approach, we assume that the parameters gA, gL are relatively close to one.
In the simulations, we set gA = gL = g < 1. This simplifies the procedure
by allowing us to focus on innovations that are unambiguously cost-reducing
and are therefore adopted by all agents. Further, our assumptions on tech-
nical change and population growth imply that if the economy is at a full
employment equilibrium in t, there will be neither excess capital nor excess
labour in t + 1. This should be interpreted as a schematic representation
(due to the linear structure of the model) of a self-correcting mechanism, or
as part of a balanced growth path. However, it is important to stress that,
as discussed in section 9 below, all of our results are robust to alternative
choices of the parameters - indeed, to altogether different specifications of
technical progress.
8.4 Simulation Results
The simulation begins with the same N0 = 100 and the same distribution of
wealth as in all previous models, and we set A0 = 0.9, L0 = 1, and b = 0.08.
For the technical change routine the threshold profit rate is pi∗ = 0.03,
gA = gL = g, and the likelihood of discovering a new technique when ap-
propriate is λ = 1. When technical change takes place, the value of g is
randomly drawn from a uniform distribution from 0.9 to 0.96. As concerns
the bargaining parameter  in equation (5), below we consider three different
scenarios, namely the two polar cases with capitalist dominance ( = 0) and
class solidarity ( = 1), and the intermediate case with  ∈ (0, 1) .
The simulation occurs in the following order: (1) determine (σνt )ν∈Nt ; (2)
determine ŵ
N(σνt )
t and pi
N(σt)
t ; (3) agents solve MP
ν
t ; (4) determine popula-
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tion lt+1 to balance the knife-edge condition;
27 (5) update At+1 and Lt+1 if
appropriate; (6) repeat steps (2)-(5) for T .
8.4.1 Capitalist dominance
Consider first the case where economic resources, and specifically ownership
of the means of production, are the key determinant of bargaining power and
 = 0. Figure 10 reports the summary results of the aggregate activity levels
(yt, xt, zt, δt), net output (1 − At)yt, net output per capita (1 − At)yt/Nt,
wealth Wt−1, the growth rate of capital gt, and the distributive variables(
ŵ
N(σνt )
t , pi
N(σt)
t
)
. Two features stand out. First, the economy rapidly settles
on a steady growth path with a constant growth rate equal to the profit
rate and constant net output per capita. Second, the bargaining power of
capitalists is such as to guarantee that the profit rate remains positive and
at a rather high level, while ŵ
N(σνt )
t = b for all t, even though the economy
never becomes capital constrained. Figure 11 displays At, Lt, and vt.
Figures 12-13(b) describe the exploitation and class status of agents.
They show a clear pattern of increasing polarisation in the economy. As
time goes by, an ever increasing proportion of the agents are exploited by an
ever decreasing minority of exploiters. The fraction of agents in the lower
classes constantly rises while that of agents in the upper classes falls. As in
section 7.1, and for similar reasons, the Gini coefficient of the exploitation
index displays a marked downward trend and tends to zero as the simulation
proceeds. This reinforces the doubts on its use as an index of the aggregate
degree of exploitation, at least in a dynamic context with variable population.
Figure 14 reports the Gini coefficient of wealth and the distribution of
wealth for select t, which also show a pattern of increasing inequality.
8.4.2 Class solidarity
Consider next the case where bargaining power is determined solely by class
solidarity and  = 1. The results are presented in Figures 15 and 16. Ac-
cumulation proceeds at a fast and accelerating pace. Given their numeri-
cal preponderance, the power of class solidarity in wage bargaining favours
27In order to ensure that lt = LtA
−1
t ωt−1 holds for all t, Nt is determined by rounding
LtA
−1
t ωt−1 up to the nearest integer. Therefore ωt−1 is also adjusted upward to maintain
the knife-edge. Any additional capital is added to the endowment of the wealthiest agent
in order to avoid random changes in the behaviour of the simulation. Any new agents
enter the simulation with ωνt−1 = 0. This is reasonable as a first approximation, or if one
interprets population growth mainly as the product of migration flows.
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Figure 10: Summary results - Bargaining model with  = 0
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Figure 11: Technology and labour values - Bargaining model with  = 0
propertyless agents who set ŵ
N(σνt )
t =
1
vt
and piN
(σt)
t = 0 for all t ≥ 1. Thus,
working class solidarity immediately eliminates exploitation and the bene-
fits of accumulation (and productivity increases) are distributed in the form
of increased wages. The figures reporting exploitation and class status are
not shown as they do not convey much information. The Gini coefficient of
(eνt )ν∈Nt is obviously equal to zero throughout the simulation.
The Gini coefficient of wealth displays an interesting behaviour over time
and provides a rather different picture, compared to the Gini of (eνt )ν∈Nt .
It initially decreases, reflecting the reduction in inequalities due to the zero
profit rate and the accumulation of wealth by all agents (since ŵt > b all
t). This trend is then reversed as growth accelerates and the number of
new, propertyless agents joining the economy in each t grows closer to (and
eventually surpasses) the number of existing agents with a positive (and
possibly quite large) amount of wealth accumulated over time.
8.4.3 Mixed scenarios
In this section, we consider economies in which  ∈ (0, 1) and the bargaining
power of agents derives both from the ownership of the means of production
and from class solidarity and collective action. The fundamental, and rather
striking result of the computational analysis is that class solidarity plays a
dominant role in the bargaining process and tends to drive the dynamics of
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Figure 12: Class and exploitation status - Bargaining model with  = 0
(a) Exploitation status (b) Class status
(c) CECP
the economy. For instance, for any  ≥ 0.5, the economy behaves in a manner
qualitatively similar to the model with  = 1: the bargaining process leads
to ŵ
N(σνt )
t =
1
vt
and piN
(σt)
t = 0 for all t.
Only very small values of  - in the range of 0.001 to 0.005 - allow for
behaviour along the knife-edge at which piN
(σt)
t > 0 and ŵ
N(σνt )
t > b, but only
for a small number of periods. For  ∈ [0.001, 0.005], the economy displays
a very interesting cyclical behaviour: the bargaining power of propertyless
agents drives profits initially to zero but, once technical change occurs, the
profit rate starts to increase. However, as population also grows, the number
of new (propertyless) agents added in every t is large and their class solidar-
ity begins to outweigh the power of relatively wealthy agents. This leads the
profit rate to decrease and even though - when piN
(σt)
t falls below pi
∗ - other
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Figure 13: Information on eνt - Bargaining model with  = 0
(a) Gini coefficient of eνt
(b) Distribution of eνt for select t (relative frequency)
technical innovations are introduced, they only allow for a short-lived recov-
ery of profitability. The economy then enters a phase during which profits
and exploitation disappear for any remaining t.
Below, we show the results of the simulation for  = 0.002. Figure 18
reports the summary results of the main aggregate and distributive variables.
As in the previous case, the combination of population growth and wage
bargaining leads to fast and accelerating accumulation. The bottom right
panel captures the cycle in the profit rate described above, where piN
(σt)
t = 0
for all t ≥ 12. Figure 19 displays At, Lt, and vt.
Figures 20(a)-20(c) show the exploitation and class status of agents. Fig-
ure 20(a) captures the lack of exploitation at the start of the simulation, its
reemergence for a while, and its eventual disappearance. Figure 20(b) reports
the dynamics of classes, which is richer than in previous models. Whenever
ŵ
N(σνt )
t > b, all agents in C
4
t accumulate and join C
2
t+1, and are replaced in
C4t+1 by the newly arrived agents with ω
ν
t = 0. Hence, the economy shows
some upward mobility. As accumulation progresses, wage bargaining medi-
ates the movement of some agents between C1t and C
2
t , but the continued
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Figure 14: Distribution of wealth - Bargaining model with  = 0
(a) Gini coefficient of wealth
(b) Distribution of wealth for select t (relative frequency)
expansion of C4t and the faster pace of accumulation induce a downward
trend in the size of C2t and an upward trend in that of C
1
t . The growth of C
4
t
(despite upward social mobility) reflects the arrival of an increasingly larger
number of propertyless agents. Figure 20(c) captures the short period of
time for which capitalists are able to convert their ownership of the means of
production into economic advantage and the CECP applies, after which the
correspondence between class and exploitation status breaks down.
Figures 21(a) shows the Gini coefficient for eνt , which mirrors the cycle
in the profit rate with exploitation intensity eventually converging to one for
all agents once piN
(σt)
t = 0. Snapshots of the distribution of e
ν
t for select t
are provided in Figure 21(b) to show the progression of exploitation intensity
to uniformity as accumulation progresses. The interaction between varying
distributional patterns and the changing composition of the population over
time leads to a pattern of the Gini coefficient for wealth (Figure 22(a)) that
is on the whole qualitatively similar to that of the model with class solidarity.
The basic intuition is the same and also reflected in the distribution of wealth
for select t shown in Figure 22(b).
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Figure 15: Summary results - Bargaining model with  = 1
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Figure 16: Technology and labour values - Bargaining model with  = 1
In closing this section, it is worth noting that a comparison of the dynamic
paths of the three models suggests that the class solidarity regime is best
and the capitalist dominance regime is worst in terms of several indicators,
including growth rates, capital accumulation, labour productivity, and per
capita consumption. Of course, this may depend on the exact specification
of our model. Yet, this insight is fundamentally consistent with the fact
that capitalist economies with a strong concentration of power in the hands
of capitalists tend to settle on dynamic paths with high profit rates and
low growth rates (at least relative to their potential), as forcefully shown
by Piketty [17]. Indeed, in terms of our model, the trajectory of advanced
capitalist economies in the last forty years (the neo-liberal era) might be
explained as the product of a shift from a kind of mixed regime with a strong
working class to a capitalist dominance regime.
9 Robustness
We have analysed many variations of our models in order to assess the robust-
ness of our results. In this section, we briefly summarise the main points.28
First, we have considered alternative specifications of the initial values of
28Results are available from the authors upon request. (See the additional results re-
ported in sections 2-5 of the Addendum.)
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Figure 17: Distribution of wealth - Bargaining model with  = 1
(a) Gini coefficient of wealth
(b) Distribution of wealth for select t (relative frequency)
the key parameters of all models. Different values of the initial population,
N0, technology, (A0, L0), consumption bundle, b0, and aggregate capital, ω0,
make hardly any difference to our conclusions.29 Different distributions of
the initial aggregate capital, ω0, also have no impact on the results, provided
capital is unequally distributed and there are some propertyless agents.
Changes in these parameters may affect the quantitative features of the
economies (e.g., the size of the various classes, the period in which the econ-
omy becomes labour constrained, and so on) but the qualitative patterns of
class and exploitation status, as well as the basic summary results, remain
essentially unchanged. It is worth noting, however, that different values of
the initial parameters yield different distributions of eνt . For example, a sim-
ulation of the basic economy with the same population and asset distribution
as in section 6, and (A = 0.5, L = 0.25, b = 0.5) yields a distribution of eνt in
the range [0.03306, 4] with a Gini coefficient of 0.26568 - quite close to the
29Subject, obviously, to the economy remaining capital constrained or on the knife edge,
depending on the model.
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Figure 18: Summary results - Bargaining model with  = 0.002
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Figure 19: Technology and labour values - Bargaining model with  = 0.002
Gini coefficient of income in actual capitalist economies.
Second, we have analysed the robustness of the main results on class struc-
ture and on the relation between exploitation and class status by adopting
an alternative definition of classes. Corollary 1 proves that class status is
determined for each agent by the difference between actual labour demand
and potential labour supply - i.e., the agent’s labour endowment. Yet one
may argue that class status should be determined based on agents’ actual
position in the labour market, and so on their actual labour supply. All of
our main insights continue to hold if this alternative approach is adopted.
Third, the results in section 7 are also strongly robust to alternative
specifications of the model and for a wide range of the key parameters, in-
cluding the growth rates of technical progress and population. None of the
key insights change if one considers economies characterised by either tech-
nical progress or population growth only; or if consumption norms depend
on other state variables, such as labour productivity, rather than wealth;
or indeed, if bt remains constant. Nor does the introduction of endogenous
capital-using labour-saving technical progress change the main conclusions,
but the economy displays an interesting phenomenon of persistent “exploita-
tion cycles”. As accumulation progresses with a given technique (At, Lt),
exploitation tends to decrease as eνt tends to 1 for all ν. However, when a
new technique is introduced, profitability and inequality in exploitation in-
tensity are restored, driving a wedge between the lower and upper classes,
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Figure 20: Class and exploitation status - Bargaining model with  = 0.002
(a) Exploitation status (b) Class status
(c) CECP
and the pattern of accumulation and exploitation resumes until another pro-
duction technique is introduced.
Fourth, section 8 already reports the results for a large set of values of the
bargaining parameter . But the key insights are robust to changes in various
other features of the model. For example, the main results remain essentially
unchanged if we relax the assumption that the likelihood of discovering a new
technique when appropriate is exactly equal to one; or if we allow technical
change to take place at a faster pace by increasing the range of g; or even
if we allow for more general nonnegative values of gA, gL. Indeed, the main
results are robust to alternative specifications of the innovation process. For
example, the introduction of exogenous labour-saving technical change along
the lines of section 7 makes virtually no difference.
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Figure 21: Information on eνt - Bargaining model with  = 0.002
(a) Gini coefficient of eνt
(b) Distribution of eνt for select t (relative frequency)
Perhaps more interestingly, in equation (5), instead of defining N νt as the
number of agents who possess exactly the same amount of wealth as ν, one
may adopt a broader categorisation and define N νt as the number of agents
with wealth within the same interval as ν, or who belong to the same class
as ν. These alternative specifications do not change the results significantly
given the rather unequal wealth distribution, and given our specification of
population growth. For in all of these scenarios the bargaining power of the
poorest segments of the working class remains unchanged, and it increases
over time as more propertyless agents appear in the economy.
Finally, the key insight on the fundamental relevance of capitalist power
for the persistence of exploitation in economies characterised by full employ-
ment remains valid even if one changes both the structure of bargaining and
the innovation process. To be specific, we have analysed models with labour-
saving technical progress and consumption co-evolving with aggregate capital
so as to maintain the economy at the knife-edge and three different ways of
determining the real wage. First, we suppose that the bargaining power of
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Figure 22: Distribution of wealth - Bargaining model with  = 0.002
(a) Gini coefficient of wealth
(b) Distribution of wealth for select t (relative frequency)
the two classes is constant and ŵt is simply set at the midpoint between bt
and the maximum value 1
vt
corresponding to pit = 0. Next, we capture the
uncertainty that usually characterises real bargaining processes by assuming
that in every t, ŵt is randomly selected within the interval [bt,
1
vt
]. In the third
scenario, we incorporate the intuition that a more buoyant economy increases
workers’ bargaining power and assume that the real wage is increasing in the
rate of accumulation, gt.
30 In all scenarios, exploitation decreases over time
and tends to disappear in the long run. Interestingly, however, the mech-
anism driving this result is different from that in section 8: the profit rate
quickly converges to the level consistent with a steady growth path and re-
mains persistently positive, but since ŵt > bt, then consistently with Lemma
2, poorer agents accumulate faster than wealthier ones, so that wealth levels
converge, eliminating the wealth differences necessary to exploitation.31
30Formally, in every period t, ŵt = kt(1/vt) + (1− kt)bt where kt = gt/(1 + gt).
31We are grateful to an anonymous referee for suggesting to explore this mechanism.
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10 Conclusions
This paper analyses the equilibrium dynamics of exploitation and class in
general accumulation economies with population growth, technical change,
and bargaining by adopting a novel computational approach. Two sets of
results emerge from the analysis. First, in capitalist economies characterised
by a drive to accumulate, labour-saving technical change plays a key role in
guaranteeing the persistence of exploitation and class by making labour per-
sistently abundant relative to capital. Nonetheless, and perhaps strikingly,
in competitive economies characterised by full employment and bargaining
over distribution, labour-saving technical change and population growth are
not sufficient to generate persistent class and exploitative relations even if
the economy never becomes labour constrained. The model forcefully high-
lights the importance of power, and specifically bargaining power, as one of
the possible determinants of the persistence of classes and exploitation. It is
only when economic resources, and specifically the ownership of the means of
production, give a significant advantage in distributive conflict - compared to
class solidarity among propertyless agents - that exploitative relations persist
over time as an equilibrium feature of capitalist economies.
Second, far from being metaphysical, the concept of exploitation provides
the foundations for a logically coherent and empirically relevant analysis of
inequalities and class relations in advanced capitalist economies. An index
that identifies the exploitation level, or intensity of each individual, eνt , can be
defined and its empirical distribution studied using the standard tools of the
theory of inequality measurement. In our analysis, we have focused on the
Gini coefficient for illustrative purposes as it is one of the most widely used
indices of dispersion, but - as our simulations show - the Gini coefficient does
not necessarily convey clear normative information about the distribution of
eνt . An interesting open question concerns precisely the appropriate aggregate
index of the intensity of exploitation.32
It would be interesting to extend our analysis to economies with n goods,
more general technologies, and even more complex bargaining procedures. A
particularly intriguing question, for example, concerns the relation between
power and technical change, and their joint relevance for class and exploita-
tion. For the use of economic resources in distributive conflict is only one
dimension of capitalist power. Control over the means of production implies
that capitalists can also determine - at least to some extent - the direction and
32The answer to this question depends on the normative insights that the notion ex-
ploitation is meant to capture. This issue is analysed in [26].
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nature of technical change. In line with the recent literature on power-biased
technical change (e.g., Guy and Skott [12]), one could analyse innovations
that allow capitalists - either directly or indirectly via changes in the struc-
ture of production - to alter power relations, for example, by affecting class
solidarity and increasing the relative weight of economic resources, .33
Another important question concerns the implications of heterogeneity in
labour skills and in consumption/leisure trade-offs. On the one hand, as al-
ready noted, the assumption that agents have identical skills and preferences,
and perform the same amount of labour leads to less extreme inequalities in
exploitation intensity than are observed in empirical income or wealth distri-
butions. We interpret our results as identifying a lower bound to exploitative
relations, and as such they seem quite remarkable. But it would be interest-
ing to analyse the effects of heterogeneity on the distribution of (eνt )ν∈Nt .
On the other hand, as is well known, the introduction of heterogeneous
labour poses major problems to the standard definition of labour embodied
vt. In this respect, it is important to stress that if the approach developed
in Veneziani and Yoshihara [27, 25] is adopted, then the definition of the
exploitation intensity index can be extended to economies with n goods,
general technologies, and heterogeneous labour, preferences and skills, and
exploitative relations can be analysed empirically based on available data.
Finally, in section 8, we have analysed the Nash solution as a technically
convenient, reduced-form approach to the bargaining problem. Following
the literature on non-cooperative implementation of bargaining solutions, the
Nash solution should be seen as the equilibrium outcome of some (unspeci-
fied) underlying non-cooperative bargaining procedure. This also provides a
justification for our focus on a bargaining-theoretic determination of distri-
bution only at the knife-edge: we interpret our analysis as a metaphor of the
effects of changes in the bargaining power of workers induced by labour mar-
ket conditions. Our model in section 8 can be understood as a special case
of a more general bargaining model in which unemployment drives workers’
bargaining power to zero. From this perspective, the wage rate is always
determined via some (noncooperative) bargaining (both in and outside of
the knife-edge), but when labour is abundant bargaining yields a wage rate
equal to the competitive equilibrium level. It would therefore be quite inter-
esting to extend our analysis by explicitly considering an underlying n-agent
non-cooperative bargaining problem in which workers’ bargaining power is a
more general (possibly, smoothly decreasing) function of the unemployment
33Or, perhaps more subtly, using a divide-and-conquer strategy that changes the relevant
Nνt for propertyless workers.
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rate.
Although it does not provide answers to these questions, this paper pro-
vides a conceptual and analytical framework to tackle them.
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